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Abstract 
 
Comparing foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey and Poland, this paper explores location choices and organizational forms 
of FDI in emerging economies. We adopt transaction cost economics and institution-based view to investigate the relationships 
between location, entry mode, and ownership structure. We validate the significance of EU accession as a determinant of FDI 
and show that a politically stable environment attracts FDI, but the sheer size of a market does not attract FDI. Our findings 
suggest that different organizational forms of FDI are favored in different institutional environments.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has substantial impact on the host country. FDI contributes to local employment, 
productivity, and knowledge transfer, especially in emerging economies. During the economic liberalization process, 
foreign investment has played an important role in transforming ownership structure and strengthening corporate 
governance. In addition to providing management and technological expertise, multinational enterprise (MNE) also brings 
credibility to the host country. This credibility may in turn attract further FDI. International market selection and choice of 
entry mode are crucial decisions that foreign investors need to make. To attract FDI, countries must acquire and build 
new competitiveness and leverage their locational advantage. 
By 1990, global inflows of FDI have reached $234 billion (UNCTAD, 1994) and by 2009, global inflows of FDI 
reached $1,114 billion (UNCTAD, 2010). The recent acceleration of FDI is fueled by policy liberalization of host countries, 
growth in mergers and acquisitions, and the expanding investment opportunities in newly privatized sectors. Privatization 
has been defined widely as the process of transferring ownership from the state to the private sector, and has been 
facilitated by the trend of broad market-oriented reforms in emerging economies around the world in the past few 
decades (Megginson & Netter, 2001, Ramamurti, 2000). In Western Europe, privatization started in the 1980s due to 
increasing globalization and economic conditions (Clifton, Comín, & Fuentes, 2003, Vickers & Wright, 1989). Mass 
privatization programs started in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Asia in the 1990s (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1994). While the emerging economies race to attract foreign direct investment, there is an obvious link between 
privatization and the inflow of foreign investment (Welfens, 1992). 
The reason to study FDI in Turkey and Poland is twofold. First, Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership 
depends on its adaptation to the EU standards, including creating supportive environment for FDI and facilitating 
privatization process. As an EU candidate country, Turkey may learn from a newly minted EU member regarding these 
issues. Second, both Poland and Turkey have abundant supplies of well-qualified labor that costs much less than 
Western countries. Out of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that have been granted official membership 
of the EU, Poland has the largest domestic market making it more comparable to Turkey regarding market size. 
Turkey is situated in a politically unstable part of the world (Coskun, 2001). Geographically, Turkey is between 
Europe and Asia and has good access to Western Europe and the Middle East. As a member of the Black Sea Economic 
Co-operation Organization, Turkey supports regional cooperation with member countries including Russia. A free trade 
area was established between Turkey and the European Union through EU-Turkey Customs Union in 1996. Turkey was 
officially recognized as the candidate country for EU membership in 1999. Since 1986, Turkey has embarked on 
privatization programs that resulted in companies jointly owned by private sectors and the government (Keller, Dogan, & 
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Eroglu, 1994). In 2005, Turkey concluded the biggest privatization in the history, when Saudi Oger Ltd acquired a 55% 
stake in former fixed phone line monopoly Turk Telekom for $6.55 billion (Demirsar, 2006).  
Having the largest domestic market in CEE, Poland has attracted significant FDI. After the fall of the Communist 
regimes, Poland has passed series of foreign investment laws (Bieszki & Rath, 1989) and seen a major change of 
ownership structure towards the private sector in the 1990s (Wojnicka, 2001). Leszek Balcerowicz, the finance minister of 
Poland’s first post communist government, started the Balcerowicz plan with a series of market reforms (Bockman & 
Eyal, 2002). These reforms brought the institutional framework closer to that of Western countries. 
Comparing FDI in Turkey and Poland, this study asks three research questions: (1) what are the location 
advantages of Poland versus Turkey? (2) What entry modes are favored by FDI in Turkey and Poland? (3) What 
ownership structures are favored by FDI in these two countries? The paper is constructed in three sections. The first 
section reviews literature and develops hypotheses. The second section empirically tests the hypotheses. The third 
section discusses findings and future research directions.  
 
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
Studies of the location choice of FDI have focused on motivations including cost reduction (Buckley & Casson, 1998), 
transaction cost minimization (Buckley & Casson, 1976, Hennart, 1982, Teece, 1986), market size (Buckley & Mathew, 
1980), and competence enhancement (Dunning, 1997, Kogut & Zander, 2003). Dunning’s (1980) OLI paradigm 
recognizes that foreign investors need to have ownership (O) and internalization (I) advantages and the host country 
needs to present location (L) advantages. Attraction of FDI lies in both factor endowments (Porter, 1990) and institutional 
contexts (Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 2000, Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) in the host country. The important factor endowments 
that attract FDI include natural resources, developed infrastructure, market size, economic growth potential, and labor 
supply. Studies have found that market size is positively related to FDI inflows in the host country (Bevan & Estrin, 2004, 
Chidlow, Salciuviene, & Young, 2009, Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002).  
Determinants of FDI locations change over time (Dunning, 1997). The changing aspects of locations are 
manifested particularly in the institutional context in emerging economies, where the transitional political, social, economic 
and legal systems often affect foreign investors’ perceived market potential and investment risk (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 
1992, Ahmed, Mohamad, Tan, & Johnson, 2002, Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2002, Henisz, 2000). Institutional 
underdevelopment is a hallmark of emerging economies (Meyer & Peng, 2005, Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 
2005). The level of political stability varies considerably among emerging economies over time (De Castro & Uhlenbruck, 
1997).  
Insights from transaction cost economics (TCE) suggest that more uncertainties lead to more transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1985). FDI may favor locations where they are less exposed to uncertainties and “hold up” problems 
(Williamson, 1985). Research integrating TCE and institution-based view (Martinez & Dacin, 1999) recognizes uncertainty 
in the institutional environment as constraints on firm choices (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999). Some scholars argue that 
institution-based view is an insightful perspective when explaining firm behavior in emerging economies (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009, Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008, Shenkar & Von Glinow, 1994). As “rules of the game,” institutions 
promote economic exchange and coordination by creating order and reducing uncertainty (North, 1990, Williamson, 
1985). If the host country has more checks and balances and more political stability, opportunistic behavior from the local 
government is much less likely (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Factors such as the randomness of the market or 
the unpredictable discretion of the policy increases uncertainty in transactions (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 1999). In an institutional 
environment where credible commitments by the government can be secured, foreign investors realize that the risk of 
having to adjust to the ever-changing regulatory structure is low (Henisz & Zelner, 2001), thus are more likely to enter.  
Hypothesis 1. A larger market is more likely to attract FDI.  
Hypothesis 2. A market with more political stability is more likely to attract FDI.  
 
2.1 European Union 
 
Regional integrations contribute greatly to FDI. Membership in multilateral organizations like the European Union (EU) is 
a significant attraction to FDI (Baldwin, Francoise, & Portes, 1997). EU countries are the major foreign investors in Poland 
and Turkey (Erdal & Tatoglu, 2002, Wojnicka, 2001). European single market has had tremendous impact on FDI in 
private participation projects (Clifton, Comín, & Fuentes, 2003). EU accession is attractive to foreign investors for two 
reasons. First, since EU accession is conditioned on liberalization to foreign capital, governments of EU candidate 
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countries need to demonstrate their willingness to offer national assets to foreign investors (Bandelj, 2009). Second, the 
psychic distance between developed economies and emerging economies are greatly reduced by the convergence of 
markets (Myer, 2001) since it is widely believed that EU accession would enhance the institutional framework.  
The relationship between Turkey and the EU has vacillated between support for and doubt over future 
membership. Concerns regarding political reform, competition law enforcement, intellectual property right protection, and 
justice system compatibility have continued to inhibit Turkey’s accession to the EU. EU membership is vital if Turkey is to 
successfully compete for foreign investment.  
Poland's accession to the EU in 2004 attracted FDI due to Poland’s continued political commitment to economic 
liberalization and favorable policies toward foreign investment. Even before 2004 there may have been increased FDI in 
Poland in anticipation of the benefits of integration. With EU membership, Poland shows more attractiveness to FDI with 
more committed market reforms and shorter psychic distance from Western countries. 
Hypothesis 3. Poland is more likely to attract FDI than Turkey.  
Hypothesis 4. After EU accession, Poland’s ability to attract FDI is stronger than Turkey’s.  
 
2.2 Entry Mode and Ownership Structure 
 
Different forms of cross-border FDI may require particular locations. The location of FDI also affects the MNE 
organizational forms (Dunning, 1993, Dunning, 2009). Understanding of locational attractiveness to FDI is insufficient 
without recognizing the relationship between MNE’s location choice and organizational forms.  
Two decisions MNE needs to make regarding its organizational forms are entry mode and ownership structure 
(Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Studies on entry mode choice recognize acquisition and greenfield as major modes 
to invest abroad and have applied transaction cost economics on entry modes broadly (Anderson & Gatingnon, 1986, 
Hennart & Park, 1993).  
In transaction cost literature with respect to foreign market entry, information asymmetry has been recognized as a 
major source of high transaction costs and poses caution for the choice of entry modes (Buckley & Casson, 1976, Meyer 
& Peng, 2005). Institution-based view further recognizes that information asymmetry is greater in a less developed 
institutional environment due to inefficiencies in the markets and leads to greater transaction costs (Dikova & Van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007, Estrin, Hughes, & Todds, 1997, Meyer, 2001). 
 MNEs entering emerging economies face high information asymmetry (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). 
Entering into a less developed institutional environment through an acquisition deal compensates foreign investors’ lack 
of information in a target country in a few ways. Compared with greenfield entry mode, acquiring assets from a local entity 
provides opportunities for foreign investors to obtain a team of managers who are familiar with the local market (Dikova & 
van Witteloostuijin, 2004) and gain product-specific knowledge (Hennart & Park, 1993). An acquisition deal can also help 
foreign investors to get access to a larger pool of suppliers and customers in the existing business networks, which would 
have cost a lot more if they try to set up the network from scratch in a greenfield investment (Conner & Prahalad, 1996, 
Peng & Jiang, 2005). Facilitating rapid entry and access to local resources, acquisition investments in less developed 
institutional environments are more likely to gain first mover advantages (Meyer & Estrin, 2001) and market specific 
experience (Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004).  
The level of institutional development of the host country plays an important role in the choice of entry mode. 
Organizations select coordination mechanisms that fit the host country (Meyer, 2001). Greenfield investment has the 
benefit of choosing the site that meets its needs best and preserving corporate culture abroad (Harzing, 2002). In a more 
developed institutional environment, the law-enforcement mechanisms may provide complementary resources for FDI to 
establish such a new facility. Greenfield investment also facilitates efficient transfer of assets from the home market 
(Hennart & Park, 1993), nevertheless, it may require the host market regulations to assist such transfer.  
Both Turkey and Poland are emerging economies that still experience a process of change towards more market-
oriented economy. Given the EU accession status, we consider that Turkey has a less developed institutional 
environment than Poland. Since we argue that acquisition entry mode is more favorable in a less developed institutional 
environment, we propose: 
Hypothesis 5. Acquisition projects are more likely to attract FDI in Turkey than in Poland and greenfield projects 
are more likely to attract FDI in Poland than in Turkey.  
Foreign investors, in addition to choosing entry modes, need to select ownership structures. MNEs may choose to 
invest in the form of joint venture (JV) with local partners or wholly owned subsidiary (WOS). Studies have explored the 
relation between entry mode and ownership structure and presented mixed results (Demirbag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2008). 
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Gomes-Casseres (1989) finds a relationship between acquisitions and JVs, whereas Larimo (2003) argues that 
acquisition is related to WOS. Caves and Mehra (1986) report that acquisitions are less likely in establishing JVs.  
Entry mode and ownership structure may be related in such a way that the decisions of both are affected by 
transaction costs. When transaction costs in a host country are high, joint venture with local partners may be favored to 
reduce uncertainty (Hennart, 1988). WOS shows high commitment and exposes the investors to substantial costs and 
risks in emerging economies (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992, Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Yung-Chih, 2007) thus may 
be less favored in a less developed institutional environment. Studies show that FDI with higher commitments are only 
likely to be established in markets that progressed further in institutional reform while an ownership structure with lower 
resource commitments may provide firms with flexibility to react to volatile market conditions (Bell, 1996, Kim & Huang, 
1992, Myer, 2001).  
Hypothesis 6. Turkey is more likely to attract FDI forming JV with local partners whereas Poland is more likely to 
attract FDI forming WOS.  
 
3. Empirical Test 
 
We acquired a data set from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database. The private 
participation projects in Turkey and Poland reached closure during the period 1990-2009 (inclusive). Closure occurs 
when private entities agree to a legally binding agreement to invest funds or provide services. After excluding projects 
with missing data, a total of 105 projects from Turkey and 192 projects from Poland are included in our sample. Out of the 
105 projects in Turkey, 61 projects have FDI. Out of the 193 projects in Poland, 159 projects have FDI.  
 
3.1 Variables 
 
FDI. Foreign direct investments are coded 1 when foreign investors participate in the project.  
Market Size. Market size is measured by GDP, obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI). The GDP is 
measured in billions of dollars in the host country—Turkey or Poland—in the year when the private participation project 
reached closure.  
Political stability. Henisz’s Political constraint index is used to measure political stability in an institutional 
environment. This index measures the feasibility of change in policy given the structure of a nation’s political institutions. 
The index is scaled 0 to 1 with 0 indicating most hazardous political environment and 1 indicating extensive checks and 
balances in the institution. Each country and year is matched with the private participation project data. The political 
stability data for year 2007 are used for the private participation projects in 2008 and 2009 since the index ends in 2007. 
Greenfield. When MNEs participate in private projects, they can build and operate a new facility. This greenfield 
entry mode in private participation is called founder privatization (Wojnicka, 2001). Another typical entry mode is 
acquisition—MNEs acquire assets of the state owned enterprise through an asset sale, public offering, or mass 
privatization program. FDI with greenfield entry mode is coded 1 and FDI with acquisition entry mode is coded 0.  
FDI with WOS. FDI that forms wholly owned subsidiaries is coded 1 and FDI that forms JV with local partners is 
coded 0.  
Control variables. Market-supporting institutions may become stronger over time because of cumulative reforms 
undertaken with individual privatization transactions (Ramamurti, 2000). Given the institutional development over time, it 
is possible that new technologies arise over time that lower the transaction costs present in markets (David & Han, 2004). 
We control for the age of the projects measured by the year lapsed from when the projects were set up till 2009. Total 
investment, the sum of investment in physical assets and payments to the government is controlled. Total investment is 
recorded in millions of US dollars. Primary industry sectors, namely, energy, telecommunication, and transportation and 
water sewage sectors are controlled.  
Binomial logistic regression is used to test hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 6. The maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters are obtained employing the regression model. To test hypotheses 4 and 5, we perform post-estimation tests 
to compare regression coefficients across different samples. 
 
3.2 Findings 
 
Table 1 summarizes the variables and Table 2 reports the results of the logistic regression model. Model 1 tests 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. The coefficients are interpreted as affecting the odds of attracting FDI. We find that the 
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coefficient of GDP is significant and negative, indicating that a larger market is less likely to attract FDI. Thus, Hypothesis 
1 is not supported. The coefficient of political stability is significant and positive, indicating that a more politically stable 
market is more likely to attract FDI, supporting Hypothesis 2. The variable Turkey is significant and negatively related to 
FDI, showing that Turkey is less likely to attract FDI than Poland, supporting Hypothesis 3.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 FDI 0.74 0.44   
2 Market size 262.56 178.52 -0.30   
3 Political stability 0.39 0.10 0.10 -0.04   
4 Greenfield 0.71 0.45 -0.19 -0.10 0.31   
5 FDI with JV 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.04   
6 FDI with WOS 0.57 0.50 0.68 -0.27 0.07 -0.20 -0.52   
7 Turkey 0.35 0.48 -0.30 0.46 -0.01 0.08 0.27 -0.44   
8 Total investment 319.95 673.71 0.11 0.11 0.02 -0.15 0.16 -0.02 0.22   
9 Age 5.62 4.61 0.11 -0.56 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.09 -0.11 -0.04   
10 Energy 0.34 0.47 -0.05 0.53 -0.03 -0.20 -0.13 0.05 0.17 -0.09 -0.23  
11 Telecommunication 0.53 0.05 0.05 -0.56 0.12 0.41 0.07 -0.00 -0.19 0.08 0.17 -0.75 
 
Table 2: Binomial logistic regression of foreign direct investment 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FDI FDI before 2004 FDI after 2004
Market size -0.01*** -0.03** -0.01**
Political stability 4.17* -0.12 7.83*
Turkey -0.93** 0.73 -1.89***
Greenfield -1.70*** -0.85 -2.78***
Total investment 0.001** 0.00 0.002**
Age -0.03 -0.18† -0.06
Energy 1.38* 1.56† 1.74†
Telecommunication -0.004 -0.14 -0.36
Constant 2.23* 7.94*** 2.34
N 297 135 162
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.14 0.37
Chi2 72.5*** 18.85* 73.91***
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <0.01 *** p <0.001 
 
To test Hypothesis 4, we perform post-estimation tests to compare regression coefficients in two samples—investments 
made before and after Poland’s EU accession. The results of the logistic regression models in these two samples are 
presented in Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 2. Poland officially entered the EU in 2004. Model 2 includes the sample 
before year 2004 and Model 3 includes the sample after (and including) year 2004. The variable Turkey is significant and 
negative in Model 3 and insignificant in Model 2, suggesting that Turkey is less likely to attract FDI than Poland only after 
Poland’s EU accession. To test if the coefficients of the variable Turkey are significantly different in the two samples, the 
estimation results of Model 2 and Model 3 are stored and combined. We use STATA’s post-estimation command “test” to 
compare the two coefficients. We find that the coefficients of the variable Turkey are significantly different in Model 2 and 
Model 3, supporting Hypothesis 4.  
To test Hypothesis 5, we also perform post-estimation tests to compare regression coefficients in two samples—
investments made in Turkey and in Poland. The results of the logistic regression models in these two samples are 
presented in Model 4 and Model 5 in Table 3. Model 4 includes 105 investments in Turkey and Model 5 includes 192 
investments in Poland. To test if acquisition projects are more likely to attract FDI in Turkey than in Poland, we compare 
the coefficients of the variable greenfield across the two samples. The estimation results of Model 4 and Model 5 are 
stored and combined. We use STATA’s post-estimation command “test” to compare the two coefficients. We find that the 
coefficients of the variable greenfield are significantly different in Model 4 and Model 5, indicating that the relationship 
between greenfield entry mode and FDI is different in Turkey than in Poland. Since the coefficient of greenfield is 
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negative in Model 4 and positive in Model 5, we conclude that acquisition projects are more likely to attract FDI in Turkey 
than in Poland, and greenfield projects are more likely to attract FDI in Poland than in Turkey. Hypothesis 5 is supported.  
 
Table 3: Binomial logistic regression of foreign direct investment 
 
Model 4 Model 5
FDI in Turkey FDI in Poland
Market size -0.01*** 0.02*
Political stability -9.19 -7.32
Greenfield -2.22** 0.23
Total investment 0.00 0.01***
Age 0.03 0.02
Energy 1.30 1.51
Telecommunication 1.44 -0.89
Constant 7.91** 0.16
N 105 192
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.35
Chi2 51.55*** 61.17***
* p <0.05 ** p <0.01 *** p <0.001 
 
Hypothesis 6 compares the ownership structure of FDI in Turkey and Poland. A subsample including 220 FDI projects in 
Poland and Turkey is used in the logistic regression model. Model 6 in Table 4 presents the result. The dependent 
variable is FDI with WOS. The coefficient of Turkey is significant and negative, indicating that Turkey is negatively related 
to FDI with WOS. The result shows that Turkey is more likely to attract FDI with JV and Poland is more likely to attract 
FDI with WOS, supporting Hypothesis 6.  
 
Table 4: Binomial logistic regression of foreign direct investment with wholly owned subsidiaries 
 
Model 6
FDI with WOS
Market size -0.002
Political stability 2.80
Turkey -2.35***
Greenfield -1.60*
Total investment 0.43
Energy 1.96**
Telecommunication 1.11†
Constant 108.76
N 220
Pseudo R2 0.23
Chi2 54.64***
† p <0.1 * p <0.05 ** p <0.01 *** p <0.001 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In this study, we find that entry mode and ownership structure are related to FDI’s location choice. In the two emerging 
markets under study, the institutional environments tend to be uncertain, especially in Turkey. We integrate TCE and 
institution-based view to test the relationship between FDI’s location choice and organizational forms.  
This study contributes to the literature by exploring the strategic choices and attributes of institutional 
environments. There are three major findings in our study. First, our results show that a politically stable environment 
attracts FDI, but the sheer size of a market does not attract FDI. It is possible that in our sample, Poland’s relative 
attraction to FDI compensates for its smaller market size. Poland’s advantage over Turkey of attracting FDI increases 
following its EU accession. Second, different entry modes are favored in different locations. Same as Demirsar’s (2006) 
finding, our results show that FDI in Turkey are more likely to participate in acquisitions of existing Turkish companies. 
FDI in Poland, however, are more likely to take greenfield entry mode and establish new facilities. Third, regarding 
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ownership structure, Turkey is more likely to attract FDI forming joint ventures with local partners whereas Poland is more 
likely to attract FDI that sets up wholly owned subsidiaries.  
Uncertainty in institutions has important implications for the design and implementation of privatization programs 
and also for the strategic responses of private entities that participate in these projects (Ramamurti, 2000). Our findings 
may have ramifications for FDI to choose entry mode and ownership structure in private participation projects based on 
the institutional environments. North (1990) argues that institutional rules develop upon path-dependent projectories. One 
source of path dependency in institutional change in privatization is that the conformity to public sector template is likely 
to continue in the newly privatized projects. This creates the necessity for foreign investors to choose the location and 
entry strategy that facilitates transactions in an uncertain institutional environment.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
After decades of reform, the market institutions in emerging economies are still inadequate, albeit improving. The 
turbulent environment and underdeveloped institutions add general uncertainty to foreign direct investments. Our study 
taps into an important and current phenomenon of foreign investors’ private participation in two important emerging 
economies.  
Two contributions emerge in this study. We draw on the location factor in Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and 
integrate TCE and institution-based view to explore the relation between foreign market entry mode, ownership structure, 
and location. Dunning (2009) argues that research on FDI without recognizing the relationship between MNE’s location 
choice and organizational forms fails to understand the attractiveness of locations. We identify and test country-specific 
and organization-specific characteristics that affect transactions in the host country. Second, We validate the significance 
of accession to the EU as a determinant of FDI. EU accession entails alignment by countries with EU policies such as 
competition and intellectual property law, and significantly attracts FDI. Our findings provide directions to FDI in emerging 
markets regarding of organizational forms, and also offer guidance to countries that race to attract FDI.  
There are some limitations to our study. The assumption that FDI has the option to choose certain entry modes, as 
shown in most entry mode literature, may not be true (Andersen, 1997). Governments may restrict private participation in 
certain projects, affecting the choice of FDI entry mode. The World Bank recognizes that private participation in foreign 
investments could be complicated. Future research on arrangements of privatization projects needs to be conducted at a 
level of detail that enables us to recognize government restrictions and distinguish the actual coordination mechanisms 
used to manage transactions. We hope that future research will challenge and extend what we have found.  
Overall, this study contributes to the research field of FDI by theoretically exploring and empirically testing the 
interrelationship between the choice of location, entry mode, and ownership structure. Our findings provide a timely guide 
to FDI’s participation in the privatization process in emerging economies. FDI also affects institutional changes in host 
countries. As Turkey prepares for EU membership, a continuous effort to attract FDI will help Turkey to prove its 
significant development of the institutional environment.  
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